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Tony K. Moore, '”According to the law of merchants and the custom of the city of London”: 
Burton v Davy (1436) and the negotiability of credit instruments in medieval England’, in 
Martin Allen and Matthew Davies (eds.), Medieval Merchants and Money: Essays in Honour 
of James L. Bolton (Institute of Historical Research: London, forthcoming 2016). 
 
AUTHOR FINAL VERSION 
 
The plea between John Burton (at least nominally) and Elias Davy heard before the London 
Mayor’s Court in 1436 is one of the most frequently-cited later medieval legal cases, if not 
perhaps the best understood. In short, Davy had failed to honour a letter of payment for £30 
made out to Burton but it was John Walden, the bearer of the letter, who seems to have 
brought suit (albeit in Burton’s name).1 The case has therefore been seen as precocious 
evidence for the negotiability of credit instruments under the ‘law merchant’ during the 
Middle Ages. This paper will first establish the wider significance of the case for our 
understanding of legal and economic development as well as how English merchants in the 
fifteenth century used credit in practice, a topic on which Professor Bolton has made a 
substantial contribution. It will then introduce the two main surviving sources for the case, 
which differ in significant ways. The bulk of the paper will reconstruct the chronology of 
events inside and outside court, highlighting points of legal and economic importance as they 
arise. Finally, it will briefly consider how this detailed reading of Burton vs Davy may 
contribute to both the debates among legal and economic historians about the early history of 
negotiability and among medieval historians over the role of credit, including whether credit 
could expand to mitigate the shortage of coin during the fifteenth century ‘bullion famines’. 
                                                          
1
 Thus the case is referred to as Burton v Davy rather than Walden v Davy. 
 Perhaps the best place to start is by defining what a negotiable instrument is and why 
it matters. The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 defines it as ‘an unconditional order in writing, 
addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to 
whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum 
certain in money to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer’.2 Similar conditions are 
set out by article 3 of the American Universal Commercial Code.
3
 In addition, the modern 
law of negotiable instruments involves three further characteristic features: they are 
transferable and the transferee can sue on them in his own name; transfer for value 
(consideration) is presumed; and a transferee, who takes one of these instruments in good 
faith and for value, becomes the holder in due course and is free from many of the defences 
that the payer could raise against the original creditor.
4
 Today, the rights of the holder in due 
course are seen as essential for the extensive circulation of negotiable instruments but, as 
James Rogers has pointed out, this is a relatively recent development. Earlier writers on the 
law of bills of exchange, such as Joseph Chitty (1799) and John Barnard Byles (1829), only 
discuss the first two defining aspects of negotiable instruments.
5
 
 Since it was edited by Hubert Hall in 1932, Burton v Davy has been cited as the 
earliest firm evidence for the negotiability of credit instruments during the Middle Ages. In 
1938, Frederick Beutel saw in it ‘the complete development of the negotiable bill of 
exchange’.6 While J. Milnes Holden was more cautious, he still thought the judgment was 
‘truly remarkable: the bearer’s right to sue was clearly recognised’.7 More recently, Rogers 
has argued that Burton v Davy falls short of modern negotiability in a number of ways: the 
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transferee Walden was not able to sue in his own name and the court heard evidence relating 
to the underlying debt, contrary to the concept of the holder in due course.
8
 However, John 
Munro thought that Burton v Davy was still significant as it made the London Mayor’s Court 
the first English court to offer ‘full protection of the legal rights of the bearer in a transferable 
bill’.9 Likewise, John Baker cited Burton v Davy when contrasting the common law courts, 
before which the bearer of an informal bill could not sue, with the London Mayor’s Court.10 
Rogers and Steve Sachs would downgrade its significance yet further, arguing that Walden 
was more likely to be acting as an attorney or collection agent for Burton than as the bearer of 
the letter, meaning that Burton v Davy is only ‘an ambivalent advocate for the rights of the 
independent holder, providing weak evidence for assignability’.11 
 These seeming arcana are of great significance for economic and legal historians. For 
a certain brand of legal history, again according to Rogers, 'it is axiomatic that the law of bills 
and notes evolved in response to a universal mercantile need for freely transferable debt 
instruments, and that the main theme in the history of the English law of bills was the 
struggle to get the common law courts to accept the principles of negotiability'.
12
 For some 
economists, the ‘law merchant’ serves as an early example of the operation of private-order 
institutions, in contrast to public-order enforcement by the state. As the economists Peter 
Leeson and Daniel Smith put it, ‘international trade first took off under a private international 
legal system called the lex mercatoria, or Law Merchant. It continues to thrive under private 
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legal arrangements today’.13 However, Emily Kadens has dismissed this as ‘the myth of the 
customary law merchant’ and Charles Donahue in more forthright terms as ‘tendentious and 
unsupported by any critical work in the primary sources’.14 The question of the relative 
importance of private-order and public-order institutions in the Middle Ages remains a matter 
of more than antiquarian interest today. 
 The question of the extent to which credit instruments were either de jure negotiable 
or at least transferred de facto is equally vital for our understanding of the later medieval 
English economy. Credit was pervasive at all levels of the medieval economy, from 
international trade to dealings within villages.
15
 A debate of particular relevance to this paper, 
and one in which the dedicatee of this volume has taken a leading role, has been the potential 
for credit to compensate for a shortage of specie in the later Middle Ages.
16
 The ‘monetarist’ 
school of thought argues that the expansion or contraction of credit is bound up with the 
supply of coined money, especially the silver coins presumed to be most used for daily 
transactions. If the royal mints are producing new coins, then potential lenders will be more 
confident about future liquidity and thus more willing to extend credit. If the supply of coined 
money is contracting, then they will hoard liquidity and be reluctant to extend credit. In the 
latter case, both the overall money supply and the velocity of circulation will fall, leading to 
either a fall in economic production or in the price level (deflation). This has obvious 
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relevance for the later medieval economy, given the recurrent ‘bullion famines’.17 On the 
other hand, it has been argued that, if economic actors are short of coin, they will turn to non-
cash based payment mechanisms, including various forms of credit.
18
 If credit instruments 
were negotiable enough to be used as a circulating medium, then this could increase the 
money supply. If they were not fully negotiable but payments could be made by assigning 
debts, this could facilitate a greater velocity of circulation. Either of these could mitigate 
some of the potentially deflationary consequences of the lack of silver in fifteenth-century 
England. The precise interpretation of Burton v Davy has major implications for this debate. 
 The remainder of this paper will reconstruct the course of events in the case, from the 
initial issue of the letter of payment in Bruges in December 1435 up to Davy’s appeal to 
Chancery in February 1437. This account is based on the two surviving sources for Burton v 
Davy.
19
 The first of these was occasioned by a royal writ of privilege issued by John Juyn, 
chief justice of the common pleas, in November 1436. This, together with the city’s reply and 
the answering royal writ were copied into the City Letter Book K. They were published in 
1911 by Reginald Sharpe, albeit in a heavily-abbreviated calendared form that omits much 
interesting detail.
20
 The second, and more detailed, account is the record of the case, 
including abbreviated versions of the above, sent by the city in response to a writ of 
certiorari from the court of Chancery in February 1437. This was edited by Hubert Hall as a 
full transcription with facing translation.
21
 While generally very good, Hall’s edition has a 
number of lacunae. These have been supplied from the original document, where they are 
clearly legible. However, there are some important limitations that need to be noted. First, we 
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do not know if the chancellor took any further action after receiving the city’s response to the 
certiorari; so it is not clear whether the city’s handling of the case was accepted or if the 
matter was summoned into Chancery. Second, in common with most surviving legal records, 
they are largely procedural and formulaic and do not provide a full recounting of the 
arguments employed by the parties. In particular, we lack information from Davy’s 
perspective and, crucially, why he refused to pay. Here it is important not to impose our 
modern concern with negotiability onto Davy – there is no explicit statement in the sources 
that any alleged transfer between Burton and Walden was ever the point of contention. 
 The reply to the writ of privilege describes the debt as the result of ‘a certain 
merchants’ exchange between the same John Burton and John Audley, factor and attorney of 
the said Elias, for and in the name of the said Elias, and to his use, previously made at the vill 
of Bruges in Flanders in the way of merchants’. The record sent to Chancery provides further 
details. It includes the text of the letter of payment, which will be discussed in detail below, 
and provides a fuller description of the underlying transaction. It states that Audley had 
purchased ‘cloth, linen and other merchandise’ in Bruges ‘to the service and use of the said 
Elias, his master’, and that these goods subsequently came into Elias’s possession in London. 
To pay for this, on 10 December 1435, Audley ‘took up by way of exchange, as is the 
common practice of merchants there’ the said £30 from Burton ‘by the hand of Thomas 
Hanworth, then Burton’s factor’. In return, Audley delivered to Hanworth a letter of payment, 
‘for security of repayment of the said sum to be made to the said John Burton, or to the bearer 
of the said letter’, on 14 March 1436. 
 This transaction helps to illustrate some important features of the contemporary 
economy. Davy was a mercer and citizen of London, resident in Bassishaw ward but also 
with interests in Croydon.
22
 Burton is described as a merchant of Norwich. He may be 
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identified with the grocer of the same name, active in that city in the 1450s and 1460s.
23
 One 
point to note is that both Burton and Davy were acting through agents overseas; Audley for 
Davy and Hanworth for Burton. This reflects the rise (or not) of the sedentary merchant 
operating through representatives rather than travelling with their goods.
24
 The fact that 
Burton was a grocer and Davy a mercer is also significant as there was a natural symbiosis 
between the trading activities of the two groups. It is worth quoting Eileen Power’s 
reconstruction of this mutual coincidence of wants in extenso: 
 
The Staplers [grocers] had Flemish money in Calais, where they sold, and in the 
marts, where they collected their debts; they wanted English money in the Cotswolds 
and London, where they bought. The mercers had English money in London, where 
they sold, and needed Flemish money at the marts, where they bought. So the Stapler 
[grocer] on the continent delivered his money to a mercer and received a bill of 
exchange payable at a future date in London in English money.
25
 
 
 The underlying transaction in Burton v Davy could be used as a textbook example of 
this sort of arrangement. It also reveals the ways in which merchants sought to use credit to 
avoid transporting specie internationally but which could also be employed locally.
26
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The letter of payment, written in French, was read out before the Mayor’s Court when 
Walden brought suit and copied into the record of the case sent to Chancery. It reads: 
 
Let this be given to my very honourable master, Elias Davy, mercer, at London. Very 
honoured sir, may it please you to know that I have received here, from John Burton 
by exchange, £30 to be paid at London to the aforesaid John or to the bearer of this 
letter of payment on the fourteenth day of March next coming, by this my first and 
second letter of payment. And I beg you that it be well paid on the day. Written at 
Bruges, the tenth day of December, by your attorney, John Audley. 
 
 The document is in the form of a short letter of payment and omits some details of the 
transaction that were not directly relevant. It does not name Hanworth as the drawee or buyer 
of the instrument, the sum received in local currency or the exchange rate, as was customary 
in Italian bills. It has long been recognised that bills of exchange could incorporate an 
element of interest by varying the exchange rate but, since neither the local payment received 
nor the exchange rate are given, it is not possible to calculate the interest rate for this 
transaction.
27
 In terms of the modern definition of a negotiable instrument as set out above, 
the letter of payment ticks all the boxes. It is ‘an unconditional order in writing, addressed by 
one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is 
addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money 
to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer’.28 The outstanding questions about the 
negotiability of medieval credit instruments do not concern the form of these documents, but 
rather how they were treated before the courts, and in particular whether they had the 
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characteristics of negotiability: transferability, presumption of consideration, and the holder 
in due course. 
 At some point between the issuance of the letter in Bruges on 10 December and when 
it came due on 14 March, it came into the possession of John Walden.
29
 Walden was a 
London merchant and grocer, who was just beginning an eminent career in city politics and at 
the Calais staple.
30
 Again, we return to the key question of the capacity in which the capacity 
Walden was acting. Unfortunately, there is a fundamental difference between our two sources 
on this point. The city’s response to the writ of privilege from the Common Pleas states that 
Burton brought suit ‘by a certain John Walden, his attorney recorded in the Chancery of the 
lord king and admitted in his place by virtue of a writ of the lord king directed to us’. In the 
record of process before the Mayor’s court sent to Chancery, however, Walden is never 
described as Burton’s attorney. Moreover, not only does the record sent to Chancery not 
mention any royal writ recognising the appointment of Walden as Burton’s attorney, but it 
does not provide any evidence that Walden was appointed by Burton as his representative at 
all beyond his possession of the letter.
31
 Instead, the record always uses the formula ‘the 
bearer of the said letter, who is held and reputed in the place of the said petitioner [Burton], 
according to the law merchant and the custom of the city of London’.  
 It is not possible to make a definitive judgement based just on these two sources. 
However, we can examine the logic of the two situations to test which is more internally 
consistent. In the case of the reply to the writ of privilege from the Common Pleas, there is a 
clear legal rationale for the city to describe Walden as Burton’s attorney. Although it was not 
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transcribed into the Letter Book, the bill initiating the plaint before the Mayor’s court was 
attached to the reply. Now, Walden had brought the plaint in person, albeit in Burton’s name, 
and so the city had to account for his appearance. While the Common Pleas presumably 
would not have recognised his standing to bring suit as the bearer of the letter, describing him 
as Burton’s attorney would have satisfied the conventions of that court. Conversely, if 
Walden was the named attorney of Burton, appointed by royal writ, why did the record of the 
case sent to Chancery not mention this, instead using the clumsy ‘bearer’ circumlocution 
translated above? There would seem to be no legal advantage to be gained by omitting 
Walden’s official status as an attorney, indeed it only raised potential complications. Further, 
the record sent to Chancery is the longer and more detailed of the two sources and, although 
it is not a verbatim record of the arguments made in the London Mayor’s court, it is probably 
closest to the reality of the process in that court. On this basis, it is more likely that Walden 
was acting as a bearer of a transferred credit instrument rather than as an attorney or 
collection agent for Burton.  
 Neither source provides any information about how this credit instrument came into 
Walden’s hands. Certainly, it was common for merchants to satisfy their own creditors by 
‘setting’ or ‘making over’ debts owed to them.32 Nightingale states that Walden had received 
the letter from Burton in settlement of a debt owed to him by Burton but there is no mention 
of this in either of the sources.
33
 This would be a telling omission, since it would have 
provided a ‘common interest’ between assignor and assignee and so avoided the objection of 
maintenance, one of the reasons why assignors could not sue in the name of the assignee at 
common law.
34
 Finally, Burton could have tried to raise some immediate cash in hand by 
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selling the letter on to a London merchant, possibly at a discount.
35
 It is even possible that the 
letter had passed through other hands before reaching Walden. Moreover, the fact that none 
of the records specify how Walden came to have the letter may demonstrate the second of 
Holdsworth’s three characteristics of a negotiable instrument, namely that consideration was 
presumed.  
 Walden then presented the letter to Davy when it fell due on 14 March and repeatedly 
thereafter, requesting the payment of the £30 in Burton’s name, ‘according to the force, form 
and effect of the said letter and the aforesaid law [merchant] and customs [of the city of 
London]’. Davy refused to pay and, eventually, on 10/11 August Walden appeared before the 
London Mayor’s Court with the letter of payment and brought plaint by bill against Davy in 
Burton’s name.36 It is noteworthy that Walden waited nearly five months after Davy had 
technically defaulted before he turned to the courts – obviously law was not the first resort of 
the medieval merchant. Walden produced the letter of payment and recounted the nature of 
the original transaction in Bruges, as set out above, as well as Davy’s repeated refusals to 
pay. Davy was then summoned to appear before the court on 1 September, ‘to be examined 
and to be respondent on the said letter of payment and the other said matters, according to the 
aforesaid law [merchant] and customs [of the city of London]’. The same day was given to 
Walden as the bearer of the letter. 
 On 1 September both Walden and Davy appeared before the mayor’s court in person 
and the letter of payment and the bill were read out to Davy. The latter then claimed a day to 
seek advice but this was rejected, as the mayor and aldermen were not advised of any 
pressing civic reason why the case should be heard on any particular day and also because, 
according to the law merchant and the custom of the city of London, ‘no discontinuance lies 
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here in any kind of mercantile causes’. The parties were given a day for the first court 
merchant after the morrow of All Souls (3 November). Still, an adjournment of two months is 
hardly the rapid process associated with the Law Merchant. 
 Just before the case was due to be heard again, the city received a royal writ of 
privilege, issued on 3 November by John Juyn, chief justice of the Common Pleas, ordering 
them to have the particulars of the case, including the date on which the bill was brought, 
before the court of Common Pleas on 9 November.
37
 The royal courts claimed that, according 
to their liberties and privileges, since time immemorial, litigants (both plaintiffs and 
defendants) were entitled to safe conduct under the king’s protection while coming to the 
courts, staying there to conduct their business and then returning home.
38
At this time, Davy 
had a number of pending actions before the Common Pleas, including a plea of debt for £26 
against William Clerk of London, a skinner. He complained that, while he was in London to 
consult with legal counsel, Burton had impleaded him before the mayor’s court and 
compelled him to answer so that he was not able to prosecute his suit against Clerk and his 
other business before the Common Pleas. Burton, Davy alleged, had brought the plaint 
‘scheming to worry and unduly burden’ Davy, ‘without regard to the liberties and privileges 
of the Common Pleas’ and to the ‘irrefutable weakening of our said court of the bench and to 
the manifest disparagement of the said liberties and privileges’.  
 Here we may pause briefly to consider Davy’s suits before the Common Pleas. His 
plea against Clerk does not seem to have proceeded to trial, so the precise nature of the 
dispute is unknown. Davy v Clerk was already at the second stage of mesne process 
(attachment) in Hilary term 1436 so the matters at issue probably date back to at least the 
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autumn of 1435 and hence predate the drawing of the letter of payment by Audley on Davy in 
Bruges on 10 December.
39
 Clerk had not appeared at the quindenes of Michaelmas and the 
sheriffs of London were ordered to seize him sicut plures for the octaves of Hilary. A postea 
note records further process up to the issue of a sicut alias capias for three weeks after Easter 
1438.
40
 Meanwhile, back in Michaelmas term 1436, Davy was also suing John Cotys of Bath, 
a chapman, over a debt of 77s 6d, William Mollysworth of Bishops Lynn (Norfolk) for the 
substantial sum of £40; and Richard Honywys of London over a debt of 40s.
41
  
 So what was going on here? Hall accepts at face value Davy’s argument that Burton v 
Davy was brought in an attempt to obstruct his suit against Clerk before the Common Pleas. 
In Hall’s words, ‘this statement, made with assurance, may remind us that in those days 
maintenance was still a fine art’.42 However, the degree of assurance with which a legal 
argument is advanced is no sure guide to its validity. In this case, the justices of the Common 
Pleas rejected Davy’s claim that the progress of Burton v Davy in the London Mayor’s Court 
would have prevented Davy from prosecuting his suit against Clerk, or any of his other 
ongoing actions, before them. That they were correct to do so is demonstrated by the fact that 
Davy later appeared in person at the following return days in those suits. Alternatively, Davy 
might have been trying to have Burton’s plea transferred from the Mayor’s Court to the 
common law courts, who took a firmer view on choses in action. However, the usual 
response to an infringement of the privilege of the Common Pleas was to vacate the process 
before the inferior court, not to summon it before the superior.
43
 This gambit might not have 
been successful in any case since, as far as the royal courts were concerned, the plea was 
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between Burton and Davy, and Walden was only the former’s attorney. It is more likely that 
Davy was simply playing for time. Suzanne Jenks quotes a Year Book case from 1432 in 
which it was claimed that a suit before the Common Pleas was ‘not brought for any reason 
other than to protect the defendant from a threat of a plea in London'.
44
 Moreover, there may 
have been a particular reason why Davy needed to stall at this time. After Philip the Bold of 
Burgundy switched his support from England to France in September 1435, trade between 
England and the Low Countries was interrupted until 1441, severely disrupting the mercers’ 
business.
45
 
 The response from the city began with a matching appeal to the antiquity of its own 
liberties and customs, describing London as ‘one of the most ancient and notable cities and 
merchant staples of the whole realm of England’. Moreover, its rights had been confirmed by 
divers royal letters patent and charters of the current king and his predecessors, as well as by 
statutes and parliaments. The city then set out its right to ‘hear and determine causes and 
actions of each and every merchant coming to the city, and against other merchants residing 
there, for all kinds of loans, bargains, exchanges and letters of payment, and other matters 
and mercantile contracts between those same merchants, or their factors, at whatsoever 
markets, fairs or merchant towns outside the realm of England in the way of merchants’. 
Such cases were to be decided by juries of foreign and local merchants or by examination of 
the parties themselves or witnesses, letters and instruments or other types of proof. Thus far 
the two sources agree. The record sent to Chancery, however, stops here while the response 
to the writ of privilege addresses Davy’s allegation that the suit before the Mayor’s Court had 
been brought in order to obstruct his actions before the Common Pleas. The latter source 
states that Davy ‘is, and was at the time of the delivery of the said writ, and had been for a 
long time before then, a merchant and citizen of the city of London’. Moreover, he was not in 
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London to consult with his legal counsel but rather ‘awaiting and attending to his articles and 
merchandise’ when he was summoned before the Mayor’s Court.  
 After inspecting the city’s response with the attached bill and hearing the arguments 
of the two parties, the Common Pleas released the case back to the Mayor’s Court. The royal 
writ rehearsing this decision provides no further explanation beyond stating that it had been 
made ‘for many reasons moving the said justices’. It is possible that the justices were 
impressed by the city’s impassioned defence of its liberties and privileges, and accepted 
London’s right to hear cases involving merchants and exchange. At least the impression that 
the royal courts had done so may explain why these documents were copied into the Letter 
Book and also into a later legal compilation, the Liber Dunthorne. It is more likely, however, 
that Juyn was ruling on a much narrower point; not accepting London’s claims so much as he 
was rejecting Davy’s argument that the suit before the Mayor’s Court was preventing him 
from prosecuting his pleas pending before the Common Pleas and thereby infringing the 
privilege of the higher court. Jenks has set out the strict conditions involved in claiming such 
privilege, and Davy would not seem to qualify.
46
 Indeed, as we have seen, Davy was able to 
continue to appear before the Common Pleas at Westminster to pursue his legal affairs 
despite the continuation of the plaint before the Mayor’s Court. It is also unlikely that Juyn’s 
ruling had any relation to Walden’s rights as the bearer of a credit instrument. Certainly the 
writ makes no specific mention of the question of the legal rights of the bearer of a negotiable 
instrument, and Juyn may not even have been aware of this part of the story given that the 
city’s response had described Walden as Burton’s attorney. 
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Oct., he would have unable 
to appear before the Common Pleas during the return day and so verdict was given in his favour. By contrast, 
Davy was never arrested or detained by the London authorities, he had attended the Common Pleas in person at 
the last return day (the quindenes of Michaelmas) and the next return day was not until the octaves of Hilary 
(20-6 Jan 1455), so it is difficult to see how the action before the Mayor’s Court would have obstructed the 
business of the superior court. 
 The royal writ was issued on 23 November and, according to the record sent to 
Chancery, Davy and Walden were immediately resummoned to appear before the Mayor’s 
Court on 29 November. Although it is not a verbatim account of the pleading in court, the 
record does set out the key procedural elements. The case was determined based on the 
examination of witnesses and evidence rather than jury trial. First, Davy was questioned and 
was not able to deny that Audley was his factor when the letter of payment was issued, and 
indeed afterwards, nor that Audley had spent the £30 on merchandise bought for his use and 
that had come into his possession. The court also heard testimony from both Hanworth and 
Audley. Despite his headline role, Burton was the one member of the four original parties to 
the letter of payment not called to testify before the court. Based on this testimony and ‘many 
other types of proof manifestly declaring the truth of the said business’, the court adjudged 
that the bill submitted by Walden as the bearer of the letter, in Burton’s name, was true. As 
Rogers has pointed out, the fact that the parties to the original transaction were examined 
suggests that Walden did not enjoy the modern rights of a ‘holder in due course’ as the bearer 
of the instrument. The verdict, given according to the law merchant and the customs of the 
city and ‘the force, form and effect of the said letter’, was that Davy should pay the £30 to the 
petitioner (Burton) or to Walden as the bearer of the letter, as well as damages assessed at 
20s.
47
 
 But this was not the end of the story as Davy appealed to the chancellor’s equitable 
jurisdiction. As with the writ of privilege, the city seems to have ignored the first writ but 
responded to a second writ sent on 14 February 1437. Unfortunately, the petition submitted 
by Davy is missing, so we do not know the reasons he gave for his appeal. It is unlikely that 
his issue could have been with the transfer of the letter from Burton to Walden in itself, since 
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Chancery was generally considered to be more sympathetic to this practice than the rigid 
common law.
48
 However, Davy’s repeated legal challenges suggest that he at least thought he 
had a legitimate grievance. Alternatively, he may have been in temporary financial straits and 
simply seeking to delay repayment for as long as possible. In response to the certiorari, the 
city sent the record of process before the Mayor’s Court, as used above to reconstruct the 
course of events. Here, there are two further points to stress. First, the record sent to 
Chancery drops the likely pretence of Walden being Burton’s royally-appointed attorney, as 
he was described in the reply to the Common Pleas’ writ of privilege. Second, while quoting 
the defence of the city’s liberties that they made in their reply to the first writ of privilege, 
they did not directly challenge or raise any objection to Chancery’s right to review the case. 
The Chancery’s response is not recorded, so it is unclear whether the case was summoned 
before the chancellor or if the jurisdiction of the Mayor’s Court over mercantile cases was 
recognised. 
 What does this all mean for the subtitle of this paper – were medieval credit 
instruments negotiable? On the affirmative side, the form of the letter of payment issued by 
Audley on Davy meets all the criteria of a modern negotiable instrument. Moreover, the fact 
that neither of the sources specifies how Walden acquired the letter suggests that 
consideration was presumed. On the negative side, the simple fact that the case is known as 
Burton v Davy and not Walden v Davy poses a major challenge to accepting it as evidence for 
negotiability as it demonstrates that Walden could not sue in his own name. In practice, as we 
shall see, this may not have been such an impediment if the right of the bearer to sue in the 
name of the initial beneficiary was generally recognised. Finally, the Mayor’s Court 
examined the parties (except Burton) about the facts of the underlying transaction, so it seems 
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that the holder in due course doctrine did not apply and that the bearer was not free from 
objections relating to the original debt. Overall, on this point we have to agree with Rogers 
and Sachs, rather than Beutel and Holden, that Burton v Davy does not support the full 
negotiability of credit instruments in medieval London. 
 At the same time, Burton v Davy does provide evidence for the assignment of debts in 
practice and their de facto enforcement by the London courts. As A.H. Thomas neatly put it: 
if the law merchant as interpreted by the city courts of London ‘did not make the transferable 
instrument fully negotiable, it made it as negotiable as was necessary for ordinary business 
purposes’.49 The court of Chancery would also entertain petitions from the holders of 
assigned credit instruments according to equity. Even the situation of the transferee before the 
common law courts may not have been as hopeless as often thought. It has been suggested 
that many bearers of transferred credit instruments could have sued as the attorney of the 
original creditor, as indeed Walden was described in the reply to the writ of privilege.
50
 In 
1426, for example, before the London Mayor’s Court William Wodeward delivered to Martin 
Allen an obligation for £10 owed to him by Sir Henry Hussey of Harting in Sussex. 
Woodward also granted that ‘he would be prepared either personally or by attorney to 
prosecute and avow all kinds of suits in whatsoever courts, moved or to be moved, whenever 
it should be necessary and he should be reasonably required thereto by the said Martin’.51 
This raises the possibility that the practice of assignment may have been much more 
widespread than the legal records would indicate, as some of the cases apparently pleaded by 
attorney may actually have been brought by bearers of transferred credit instruments. 
                                                          
49
 Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London 1381-1412, p.xxxvi. 
50
 See the year book case of 1455 cited in F. Pollock, Principles of Contract: A Treatise on the General 
Principles Concerning the Validity of Agreements in the Law of England (9
th
 ed., London, 1921), pp.753-4; S.J. 
Bailey, ‘Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Century’, Law Quarterly Review, 
48 (1932), II, pp.265-6, III, pp. 551-4, 580-1; Holdsworth, History, VII, pp.534-5. 
51
 Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London 1413-1437, pp.200-1. 
 This reconstruction of Burton v Davy has some legal significance. In particular, 
although medieval credit instruments were not negotiable in their full modern sense, there is 
nonetheless substantial historical evidence that, in practice, debts were assigned and 
transferred. This could be read as supporting Rogers’s recent argument that the enhanced 
rights of the holder in due course are not essential for a functioning secondary credit market, 
and indeed they may have undesirable consequences.
52
 More generally, there is a danger of 
reading our modern legal interest in negotiability back into the past. Most of the evidence for 
the transfer of credit instruments can be found in incidental mentions during the course of 
pleading rather than forming the subject of dispute itself. As noted above, we do not know 
what Davy’s objections to honouring the letter of payment actually were. Indeed, he may 
simply have been seeking to drag out proceedings for as long as possible for financial 
reasons. 
 This re-interpretation also has implications for our understanding of economic history. 
Medieval litigants tailored their legal strategies and terminologies to suit the particular courts 
that they were using. Burton v Davy provides a neat illustration of this; Walden was described 
as Burton’s attorney in the city’s reply to the common pleas but as the ‘bearer of the letter’ in 
that to Chancery. The constant shifting of terms to fit in with court procedure and 
jurisdiction, and the ways that contracts were structured to enable the use of the courts, 
further suggests that public-order institutions were important to merchants and they did not 
rely solely on private-order enforcement mechanisms. On the other hand, the law courts may 
have only been used as a last resort; as we have seen, Walden waited nearly five months 
before bringing suit. It is clear that reputation was vitally important in medieval trade. A 
merchant needed to assess the creditworthiness of potential counterparties to know whose 
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bills obligatory to accept and whose to reject.
53
 From the borrower’s perspective, as the 
cuckolded merchant in Chaucer’s Shipman’s Tale put it: ‘we may creaunce whil we have a 
name’.54 In fact, rather than an inherent conflict, there was an intimate link between public 
and private order enforcement mechanisms during the Middle Ages.
55
 
 Finally, what does it mean for the potential of credit to mitigate the ‘bullion famines’ 
of the later Middle Ages? It seems that, although not fully recognised by the courts, the 
transfer of credit instruments may have been much more extensive than previously thought. 
Frederick Lane and Reinhold Mueller have suggested that English merchants compensated 
for the absence of moneychangers or giro banks ‘by assigning and discounting such credit 
instruments as letters obligatory and bills of exchange long before endorsement became 
widespread’.56 In modern terms, the Flemish and Italians used bank finance while the English 
merchants engaged in market finance (today’s ‘shadow banking’).57 The fact that such credit 
instruments were not fully negotiable probably meant that they could not circulate widely as 
money substitutes; most examples from the Middle Ages involve only a handful of transfers 
whereas early modern bills could be transferred by endorsement dozens of times. As a result, 
they may not have served to expand the money supply per se. However, the inventive use of 
credit minimised the need to make payments in cash. This could have increased the velocity 
of circulation and so have had a similar economic effect in countering the deflationary impact 
of a reduction in the amount of coin available. 
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